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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Utah Labor Commission is contained in the Record at 159-162.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final order of the Utah Labor Commission. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-l-303(6); 34A-2-801(8)(a); 63G-4403(1); and 78A-4-103(2)(a).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This case arises from the Labor Commission's decision concluding that the
Administrative Law Judge's decisions and orders were adequate in awarding Respondent
Stuart Seely ("Seely") permanent total disability benefits under Utah Code Annotated
("UCA") §34A-2-413.
Specifically, Appellant ("Columbia") contends that the Administrative Law Judge
("ALJ") failed tol) resolve all conflicts in the evidence and 2) make requisite findings
regarding whether successful rehabilitation was possible.
While the Labor Commission is the ultimate finder of fact, Columbia refers
directly to the ALJ throughout its brief. See Carter v. Labor Comm'n. 153 P.3d 763, 767
(Utah App. 2006). Although there is a distinction between the ALJ's findings and the
Labor Commission's ultimate findings, that distinction is minimal considering the Labor
Commission adopted the ALJ's Findings of Fact. (R. 159.)
Seely believes the issues are best addressed in the following order:
Issue 1. Did the Labor Commission err in rejecting Columbia's contention that the
ALJ left issues unresolved? Columbia contends that unresolved conflicts in the ALJ's
3

Findings of Fact led to Columbia's creation of a defective reemployment plan. Columbia
does not contest the Findings of Fact as inaccurate, only that the ALJ did not make
findings of fact as required by law.
Standard of Review: "The adequacy of findings is a question of law" to be
reviewed "under a correction of error standard." Strate v. Labor Comm'n, 136 P.3d 1273,
1276-77 (Utah App. 2007).
Preservation for Review: Seely believes Columbia did not preserve this issue for
review. Please refer to the argument below.
Issue 2. Did the Labor Commission err in concluding that the ALJ made requisite
findings regarding whether successful rehabilitation was possible? Columbia asserts that
the defective reemployment plan made it impossible for the ALJ to find that no
successful rehabilitation was possible for Seely.
Standard of Review: "The adequacy of findings is a question of law" to be
reviewed "under a correction of error standard." Strate v. Labor Comm'n, 136 P.3d 1273,
1276-77 (Utah App. 2007).
Preservation for Review: Insomuch as this issue is contingent on the first issue
above, Seely believes that Columbia did not preserve this issue.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A full and unprejudiced recitation of the underlying facts can be found on pages
1-4 of the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
("Findings of Fact") dated January 5, 2007. (R. 93-99.) Subsequent procedural facts and
4

findings can be found in the ALJ's September 3, 2007 Order of Permanent and Total
Disability ("Final Order"). (R. 123-126.) The Labor Commission's August 31, 2010
Order Affirming ALJ's Decision gave the Labor Commission's final decision regarding
this claim which can be found on pages 159-162 of the record. Below is a recitation of
the facts and procedural history pertinent to this appeal.
Appellee Seely injured his low back in 1996 working at St. Mark's Hospital,
owned by Appellant Columbia. (R. 93.) He was diagnosed with a lumbar herniated disc.
R. 94. He had surgery and was left with a 10% permanent impairment rating. (R. 94.)
After transferring to Timpanogos Regional Hospital, which is also owned by
Columbia, Seely again hurt his back moving a heavy patient. (R. 94.) He was diagnosed
with a herniated disc and received injections, a discectomy, and a nerve root
decompression. (R. 94.) After subpar recovery, Seely had another decompression and a
pedicle screw fixation later that same year. (R. 94.) At that time, he was given a 15%
permanent impairment rating. (R. 94.)
In 2002, the pedicle screws were removed. (R. 94.) Facet injections were later
administered. (R.94.) In 2003, an EMG revealed mild right L5 radiculopathy. (R. 95.)
The medical record indicates Seely experienced other work injuries for which he sought
treatment. (R. 95.)
Seely was terminated on May 20, 2003, for alleged drug possession and has not
worked since. (R. 95.) Seely continued treatment, which included an ineffective nerve
root block and a nerve root decompression. (R. 95.) Seely was given a combined 23%
permanent impairment rating. (R. 95.)
5

Seely began seeing a pain specialist in January 2005, who noted that Seely's daily
living activities were significantly hindered by his back condition. (R. 96.)
Seely filed an Application for Hearing on November 14, 2005. (R. 93.) Among
other reliefs requested, Seely requested permanent total disability benefits. (R. 93.) A
hearing was held.
In her Findings of Fact, the ALJ recited Seely's long medical treatment history and
concluded with: 1) Seely testified he could only sit/stand for 30 minutes at a time; 2) his
maximum lift was 35 pounds; 3) he was 58 years old; 4) he has a high school diploma; 5)
he worked as a radiology technician since 1972; 7) he worked in hospitals and was in the
Navy prior to 1972; 6) he is deaf in his left ear; and 7) he was willing to work and desired
retraining. (R. 96.)
After reciting the requirements for establishing permanent total disability
eligibility, the ALJ additionally stated that 1) Seely sustained significant impairments, 2)
he was not gainfully employed, 3) his back injuries prevented him from performing the
essential functions of a radiology technician, 4) he has no skills outside that of a
radiology technician, 5) the industrial accident of 2000 was the direct cause of Seely's
disability, and 6) medical records suggested that degeneration was expected with Seely's
type of injury and the subsequent procedures. (R. 98.)
The ALJ ordered Columbia to pay Seely subsistence benefits and gave Columbia
1) 30 days to submit notice if it intended to submit a reemployment plan pursuant to
U.C.A. § 34A-2-413(6) and 2) 60 days from the date of the Findings of Fact (January 5,
2007) to submit that reemployment plan. (R. 98.)
6

Columbia made no objection to the Findings of Fact. (R. 160.) On February 5,
2007, Columbia sent notice that it intended to submit a reemployment plan. (R. 160.)
Columbia instructed its vocational rehabilitation specialist to create a reemployment plan
based on a 10-pound lifting restriction. (R. 160.) Columbia did not provide a copy of the
ALJ's Findings of Fact to its vocational rehabilitation specialist. (R. 160.) The vocational
rehab specialist did not contact Seely about his limitations. (R. 160.) Columbia submitted
an untimely reemployment plan on April 26, 2007. (R. 123.)
The ALJ held a hearing on the reemployment plan and found that the plan was
inadequate because 1) the plan only considered retraining Seely for one job—that of a
radiology technician; 2) the plan did not consider that Seely did not have a current license
to work as a radiologic technologist and did not provide a plan to recertify Seely; 3) no
indication was given as to what the weight and frequencies that would be required of
Seely in that employment; 4) the plan did not consider Seely's medications; 5) the plan
did not consider whether Seely could take days off; and 6) what the sit/stand
requirements would be of that employment. (R. 124.) The ALJ found that the plan was
not "reasonably designed to return [Seely] to gainful employment" and awarded Seely
permanent total disability benefits. (R. 124-25.)
Columbia filed a motion for review with the Labor Commission. (R. 130-34.)
Columbia's primary argument was that it was unable to develop an adequate
reemployment plan because the ALJ's Findings of Fact were inadequate. (R. 159.)
The Labor Commission affirmed the ALJ. (R. 161.) First, the Labor Commission
recognized that Columbia made no objection to the Findings of Fact and simply accepted
7

that Seely had a 10-pound weight restriction. (R. 160.) Second, the Labor Commission
found that the reemployment plan was unreasonable because 1) the vocational rehab
specialist had not contacted any potential employers to see if they could accommodate
the plan's assumed 10-pound restriction; 2) the plan failed to consider Seely's lack of a
current radiological technician license; and 3) the plan failed to consider Seely's use of
narcotic medications in retraining him. (R. 160.) Third, the Labor Commission
recognized that the reemployment plan considered only one job, that of a radiologic
technician, which Seely could not perform. (R. 161.) The Labor Commission also noted
that Columbia did not provide the vocational rehab specialist with the Findings of Fact,
and that the vocational rehabilitation specialist did not contact Seely regarding his work
restrictions. (R. 160.)
Columbia now appeals the Labor Commission's decision to the Utah Court of
Appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the Labor Commission's decision because the issue was
not preserved, Columbia was not prejudiced by the alleged error, no conflicts were left
unresolved by the ALJ, and the ALJ properly followed the correct procedures in
awarding permanent total disability benefits.
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ARGUMENT
I. THE LABOR COMMISSION'S DECISION WAS CORRECT BECAUSE 1)
COLUMBIA DID NOT PRESERVE THIS ISSUE FOR APPEAL, 2) THE
REJECTED REEMPLOYMENT PLAN WAS DEFECTIVE FOR A
MYRIAD OF REASONS, AND 3) THE ALJ'S FINDINGS OF FACT WAS
CLEAR AND LEFT NO CONFLICTS UNRESOLVED.
A. Columbia's silence as to the Findings of Fact did not preserve this issue.
Columbia claims that the ALJ committed error by not resolving conflicts in the
evidence. Specifically, Columbia believes that the ALJ did not resolve conflicts regarding
Seely's work restrictions and that this alleged error made it impossible for Columbia to
create a suitable reemployment plan. The Labor Commission affirmed the ALJ
recognizing that Columbia did not object to the ALJ's Findings of Fact at the appropriate
time, namely, before the creation of a reemployment plan. (R. 160.) Claimed errors must
be raised in a timely fashion in order to facilitate correction during the proceedings.
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted).
If a party objects to a judge's findings, that party cannot remain silent for the rest
of the process and later claim judicial error. The Utah Supreme Court presented
requirements for an issue to be preserved for appeal in a hearing: "(1) the issue must be
raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must
introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal
Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The
purpose of this requirement is twofold. First, it "is to put the judge on notice of the
asserted error and allow the opportunity for correction at that time in the course of the
proceeding." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). Second, this requirement
9

"prevents a party from avoiding the issue at trial for strategic reasons only to raise the
issue on appeal if the strategy fails." Tschaggenv v. Milbank Ins. Co., 163 P.3d 615, 620
(Utah 2007).
Columbia accepted the underlying Findings of Fact by its silence. When the ALJ
submitted the Findings of Fact to the parties, Columbia did not object. No indication was
given that Columbia was confused or found the restrictions in the Findings of Fact to be
ambiguous. Columbia sought no clarification from the ALJ regarding the work
restrictions. Instead, Columbia submitted notice that it intended to submit a
reemployment plan and began pursuing that plan. There is no indication in Columbia's
actions that, at that time, it was confused by the ALJ's Findings of Fact.
Only after Columbia received an unfavorable outcome—the ALJ's Final Order
awarding permanent total disability benefits after the hearing on the reemployment
plan—did it voice its disapproval to the initial Findings of Fact and claim the ALJ
committed an error by not resolving conflicting evidence. Such an action did not "put the
judge on notice of the asserted error" and certainly did not "allow the opportunity for
correction at that time in the course of the proceeding." Badger, 966 P.2d at 847.
Columbia is impermissibly attempting to get a second chance at creating a reemployment
plan after its first strategy failed.
Columbia did not preserve this issue for appeal by remaining silent during the
process and claiming judicial error after an unfavorable outcome.

10

B. The Labor Commission correctly rejected the reemployment plan.
If this Court decides to address the merits of this case, then Seely contends that the
Labor Commission's decision to affirm the ALJ was correct because 1) Columbia
suffered no prejudice by the alleged error, 2) it is legally permissible for an ALJ to reject
a defective reemployment plan, and 3) there were no conflicts left unresolved by the ALJ.
1. Columbia was not prejudiced by the alleged error.
Columbia asserts that the ALJ committed an error by not providing specific work
restrictions which led to Columbia's inability to create a suitable reemployment plan.
However, Columbia's reemployment plan was defective for reasons unrelated to the
alleged confusion regarding the work restrictions. In order for a judicial error to compel
reversal, it must have been prejudicial. Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Utah
1997). A reversal is in order only if the error had a reasonable likelihood of affecting the
outcome of a case. Id.
Columbia's reemployment plan was defective independent of any work restriction
discrepancy. The ALJ noted in her Findings of Fact that Seely's "injuries prevent him
from performing the essential function of lifting required of a radiology technician." (R.
97.) Yet, Columbia's reemployment plan considered rehabilitating Seely for one and only
one job—that of a radiology technician. (R. 124.) In affirming the ALJ's decision, the
Labor Commission noted that the reemployment plan failed to consider both 1) Seely's
lack of a current radiology technician's license and 2) substantial use of narcotic
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medications to manage his pain.1 (R. 160.) Those flaws are attributable to both 1)
Columbia's failure to provide the vocational rehab specialist with a copy of the ALJ's
Findings of Fact and 2) the vocational rehabilitation specialist's failure to contact Seely
and inquire about his license status. Id. Additionally, the Labor Commission recognized
that the plan was internally defective as the vocational rehab specialist had not contacted
any potential employers to see if they could accommodate the reemployment plan's
assumed 10-pound weight restriction.2 Id. These flaws rendered the plan defective and
were the result of Columbia's and its vocational rehabilitation specialist's failures,
independent of any alleged judicial error creating confusion regarding work restrictions.
Columbia's multiple errors in creating the reemployment plan eliminate any
reasonable likelihood that the outcome of this claim would have been different had the
alleged judicial error not occurred. Therefore, Columbia was not prejudiced and reversal
of the Labor Commission is not in order.

These flaws are inadequacies directly relating to Findings of Fact. Columbia's argument
avoids challenging the factual findings in order to have a question of law standard. If
Columbia were to challenge these facts, which evidence that Columbia was not
prejudiced by the alleged judicial error, or any other findings of fact, that challenge
would be under a question of fact, substantial evidence standard. See Hymas v. Labor
Comm % 200 P.3d 218, 222 (Utah Ct. App. 2008).
This flaw refers to Columbia's failure to contact any potential employers to see if they
could accommodate Seely. Seely does not know how Columbia came to a 10-pound
restriction and that is irrelevant to this argument. The fact is that Columbia assumed a 10pound weight restriction yet contacted no potential employers to see if they could
accommodate that restriction. Such a failure renders the proposed plan inadequate and
internally defective.
12

2. The Labor Commission's rejection of a defective reemployment plan is
legally permissible.
Columbia asserts that the ALJ did not resolve the conflicts regarding Seely's work
restrictions in her Findings of Fact. That inadequacy in the Findings of Fact, Columbia
argues, led to a defective reemployment plan. "The adequacy of findings is a question of
law" to be reviewed "under a correction of error standard." Strate v. Labor Comm'n, 136
P.3d 1273, 1276-77 (Utah App. 2007).
It is legally correct for the Labor Commission to reject a defective reemployment
plan. Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor Commission, 38 P.3d 969, 973 (Utah App. 2001). In
Color Country, an ALJ rejected a defective reemployment plan because it was 1) based
on work restrictions materially different than those specified by the doctor and 2) the
reemployment plan drafter was never given a copy of the ALJ's initial findings of fact or
the doctor's restrictions. Id. In that case, this Court determined that "[t]he Commission
correctly applied the law in determining that the plan was not reasonable." Id. at 974.
Just like Color Country, Columbia's reemployment plan was defective.
Columbia's reemployment plan was based on work restrictions that were materially
different than those indicated by the ALJ.3 Like Color Country, Columbia failed to
provide a copy of the ALJ's order to the vocational rehabilitation specialist responsible

3

As discussed below, the ALJ indicated a 35 pound weight restriction and Columbia
created a reemployment plan based on a 10 pound weight restriction. It is unclear to the
Respondent exactly how Columbia reached that 10 pound conclusion, but Respondent
does not dispute that, had the reemployment plan been adequate under terms for a 10
pound weight restriction, it would also have been adequate under Seely's 35 pound
weight restriction.
13

for drafting the reemployment plan. (R. 160.) Additionally, the vocational rehabilitation
specialist did not contact Mr. Seely to obtain information regarding his work restrictions
and had various other inadequacies discussed above. Just like Color Country, the ALJ
"correctly applied the law in determining that the plan was not reasonable." Color
Country, 38 P.3d at 974.
Columbia's reemployment plan was plagued with deficiencies. These deficiencies
rendered the reemployment plan defective and it was a correct application of the law for
the Labor Commission to reject the defective plan.
3.

The ALJ did not leave any conflicts unresolved.

Columbia asserts that the Findings of Fact was inadequate because multiple work
restrictions created a conflict that went unresolved by the ALJ. However, from the ALJ's
findings of fact adopted by the Labor Commission, it is clear that Seely's work
restrictions were not left unresolved. "The adequacy of findings is a question of law" to
be reviewed "under a correction of error standard." Strate v. Labor Comm'n, 136 P.3d
1273, 1276-77 (Utah App. 2007).
The ALJ set out to summarize Seely's long medical history on pages 1-4 of the
January 5, 2007 Findings of Fact. (R. 93-96.) That history included at least 4 work
injuries, 3 surgeries, and multiple injections and other treatments from 1996 through
2005. Id. During this course of injuries, surgeries, and treatments, it is expected that an
injured worker's condition would not remain constant but improve at times and decline at
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others. The ALJ portrayed those ups and downs by including Seely's work restrictions at
certain times throughout his history. Id.
The ALJ concluded the summary noting that Seely testified he could only
sit/stand for 30 minutes at a time and also that Dr. Dall and Dr. Chung agreed upon
Seely's impairment ratings. (R. 96.) The ALJ then unequivocally concludes, "The
Petitioner is not capable of transferring bedridden or wheelchair patients as he used to do.
His maximum lift is 35 pounds and if he can find employment with that accommodation,
he can work." Id. Whether this conclusion is part of Dr. Chung's and Dr. Dall's
agreement or whether it is the ALJ's own conclusion is unclear.4 What is clear, however,
is that the ALJ was concluding the summary with Seely's work restrictions at the time of
the hearing—35 pounds. 5 This is especially true considering the ALJ follows the
statement with Seely's age, education, and previous work history which, together with
the work restrictions, are the criteria to be evaluated under UCA § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) in
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Either option is permissible. If it is the weight restriction most recently agreed upon by
both Dr. Chung and Dr. Dall, then it is "clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one
conclusion." Strate v. Labor Com'n, 136 P.3d 1273, 1276 (Utah App. 2006). If it is the
ALJ's conclusion, then this conclusion satisfies Carter v. Labor Comm 'n Appeals Board
which states, "[i]t is the province of the Board, not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting
evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is
for the board to draw the inferences." 153 P.3d 763, 767 (Utah App. 2006).
5
Respondent believes that the weight restriction of 35 pounds was the ALJ's own
conclusion inferred from the record. Respondent believes this because throughout the
medical summary, the ALJ referred to the work restrictions by either 1) with the doctor's
name, followed by a verb such as "opined," "indicated," or "recommended" followed by
the weight restriction or 2) followed the weight restriction with a direct reference to the
medical exhibit. On Page 4 of the Finding of Fact, the ALJ does not immediately precede
the final weight restriction of 35 pounds with a doctor's name and verb nor does the ALJ
follow the restriction with a citation. Therefore, it appears that the weight restriction
provided is the ALJ's inferred conclusion.
15

order to determine permanent total disability. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 164
P.3d 384, 393 (Utah 2007).
Columbia attempts to obscure that simple finding by jumbling the ALJ's
organized medical history. Petitioner's Brief, 10. In that recitation, Columbia abandons
the ALJ's original chronological order and omits the dates from 3 of its 7 excerpts. Id.
For instance, the dates of examples 1,3, and 7 are omitted and are July 28, 2003, January
20, 2004, and October 17, 2001, respectively. If the ALJ had presented the medical
history as Columbia does, it would be very unclear. However, the ALJ composed a very
organized recitation leading to a clear conclusion of work restrictions, which the Labor
Commission adopted.
Additionally, the ALJ's consideration of the untimely reemployment plan based
on a 10 pound weight restriction does not muddle the ALJ's finding of a 35 pound weight
restriction. The ALJ's responsibility is to examine a submitted reemployment plan and
determine whether it is adequate. See Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor Comm'n, 38 P.3d
969, 973 (Utah App. 2001) (stating that it is the ALJ's responsibility to examine the
reasonableness of a reemployment plan). Since a 10 pound weight restriction would
qualify for an individual who has a 35 pound maximum weight restriction, considering
the plan as a whole was prudent. The ALJ found that the reemployment plan was
inadequate because of the various deficiencies discussed above.
The work restrictions were clear from the Findings of Fact. Columbia's assertion
that the ALJ left conflicts of evidence unresolved is unfounded.

16

Summary: Columbia contends that the ALJ did not resolve all conflicts in her
initial Findings of Fact. However, Columbia waited until after acting on those Findings of
Fact and an unfavorable outcome before it made its objection known. Therefore,
Columbia did not preserve the issue for appeal. If this Court decides to determine this
case on the merits, there still remains no reason to reverse the Labor Commission because
Columbia was not prejudiced by the alleged judicial error, it was legally permissible for
the Labor Commission to reject the defective plan, and Columbia's allegation of
unresolved conflicts are unfounded. Therefore, this Court should affirm the Labor
Commission's award of permanent total disability benefits.
II. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COMMISSION'S DECISION
BECAUSE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE PROPERLY
FOLLOWED THE PROCEDURES IN AWARDING SEELY PERMANENT
TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS
Columbia's second issue is difficult to decipher. It appears that Columbia
disagrees that Seely is permanently totally disabled because Seely did not prove he could
not work nor did the ALJ make adequate findings that Seely could not work. This
argument is at least partially, if not wholly, based on the allegation that the ALJ failed to
resolve conflicts in the evidence which is addressed in Part I above and incorporated
herein.
Columbia also claims that "there were no findings made to support the conclusion
that respondent was permanently and totally disabled except for the brief finding where
the ALJ determines that the respondent has 'significant sit/stand restrictions,'" followed
by evidence that, Columbia asserts, proves Seely can work. Petitioner's Brief, 14.

17

However, Columbia misunderstands the process as to how the Labor Commission awards
permanent total disability benefits and Columbia's assertion that the ALJ failed to
adequately follow that process is unfounded in the law.
Awarding permanent total disability benefits is a process that involves various
considerations. First, the injured worker has the burden of proving the four requirements:
1) he is not gainfully employed; 2) he has an impairment that limits his ability to do basic
work activities; 3) the impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential
functions of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the time
of the industrial accident; and 4) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably
available taking into consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience,
medical capacity, and residual functional capacity. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus,
164 P.3d 384, 396 (Utah 2007).
More than Columbia's mere allegation that the ALJ stated "respondent has
'significant sit/stand restrictions,'" (Petitioner's Brief, page 14) the ALJ noted each
requirement was met in the Conclusions of Law section of her January 5, 2007 order,
which was adopted by the Labor Commission. Specifically, the ALJ noted that 1) Seely
was not employed; 2) he has sustained significant impairments "indicated by his
restrictions, limitations, impairment ratings, etc."; 3) Seely could not perform the
essential functions of a radiology technician; and 4) Seely is 58, has a high school
diploma, lifting restrictions (35 pounds) as well as sit/stand restrictions, has no training
other than for a job as a radiology technician, and cannot perform other work. (R. 97-98.)

18

Once an ALJ finds that an injured worker is permanently totally disabled, the
employer is given an opportunity to show that rehabilitation is possible by submitting a
reemployment plan. The ALJ reviews that reemployment plan and either accepts or
rejects it. Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor Comm'n, 38 P.3d 969, 973 (Utah App. 2001).
In this case, the ALJ appropriately gave Columbia the opportunity to provide a
reemployment plan. Columbia submitted a reemployment plan which the ALJ rejected,
therefore finding that successful rehabilitation was not possible.
Lastly, if the ALJ rejects the reemployment plan, then the injured worker is
presumed to have carried his burden in proving he is entitled to permanent total disability
benefits. See id. (Under similar facts as this case, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the
Labor Commission's determination that the injured worker had carried her burden of
proving permanent total disability after the rejection of a reemployment plan).
Columbia's claim that the ALJ committed error is without merit. Columbia asserts
that, since there was "significant evidence, including the various opinions of numerous
physicians, showing that respondent could be returned to work within certain
restrictions," the ALJ could not permissibly determine Seely was permanently totally
disabled. Petitioner's Brief, 14. However, as noted above, awarding permanent total
disability awards is a process and consists of many more considerations than work
restrictions alone.
Seely met his burden in proving permanent total disability. Columbia was given an
opportunity to submit a reasonable reemployment plan, which it failed to do. The ALJ
made no error and stated in the Findings of Fact each consideration required to show
19

permanent total disability. Those findings were adopted by the Labor Commission in
affirming the rejection of the reemployment plan and awarding permanent total disability
benefits to Seely. No error was made and, therefore, this Court should affirm the Labor
Commission's ruling.
CONCLUSION
Columbia's appeal is untimely. Columbia alleges that the ALJ's Findings of Fact,
adopted by the Labor Commission, were unclear. However, instead of objecting to the
findings of fact at the time they were presented, Columbia gave notice that it intended to
submit a reemployment plan. Only after the ALJ made its final determination of
permanent total disability did Columbia voice its complaint, which the Labor
Commission recognized was untimely. The alleged judicial error would not have affected
the outcome of the claim and is therefore not prejudicial because Columbia's
reemployment plan was plagued with deficiencies independent of the alleged error. It was
legally permissible for the Labor Commission to reject that defective reemployment plan.
Additionally, Columbia's allegation of judicial error for not resolving conflicting work
restrictions is without merit as the ALJ clearly indicated Seely's work restrictions at the
time of the hearing. The ALJ committed no error in this process and the Labor
Commission properly awarded permanent total disability benefits to Seely. Therefore,
this Court should affirm the Labor Commission's ruling.
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Respectfully submitted,

Sandra N. Dredge
Counsel for Respondent Stewart
Seely
February 9, 2011
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ADDENDUM
Reproduction of determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules:
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-l-303(6): (6) If an order is appealed to the court of appeals after
the party appealing the order has exhausted all administrative appeals, the court of
appeals has jurisdiction to:
(a) review, reverse, remand, or annul any order of the commissioner or Appeals
Board; or
(b) suspend or delay the operation or execution of the order of the commissioner or
Appeals Board being appealed.
Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-413. Permanent total disability -- Amount of payments —
Rehabilitation.
(1) (a) In the case of a permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident
or occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this
section.
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee
must prove by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as
a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent
total disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease is the direct cause of the
employee's permanent total disability.
(c) To establish that an employee is permanently totally disabled the employee must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the
employee's ability to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments
prevent the employee from performing the essential functions of the work activities for
which the employee has been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or
occupational disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability claim;
and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into
consideration the employee's:
(A) age;
(B) education;
(C) past work experience;
(D) medical capacity; and
(E) residual functional capacity.
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(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those
provided under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant:
(i) may be presented to the commission;
(ii) is not binding; and
(iii) creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act.
(e) In determining under Subsections (l)(b) and (c) whether an employee cannot
perform other work reasonably available, the following may not be considered:
(i) whether the employee is incarcerated in a facility operated by or contracting with a
federal, state, county, or municipal government to house a criminal offender in either a
secure or nonsecure setting; or
(ii) whether the employee is not legally eligible to be employed because of a reason
unrelated to the impairment or combination of impairments.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week
entitlement, compensation is 66-2/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time
of the injury, limited as follows:
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury;
(b) (i) subject to Subsection (2)(b)(ii), compensation per week may not be less than the
sum of $45 per week and:
(A) $5 for a dependent spouse; and
(B) $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four
dependent minor children; and
(ii) the amount calculated under Subsection (2)(b)(i) may not exceed:
(A) the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a); or
(B) the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury; and
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under
Subsection (2)(b) is 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest
dollar.
(3) This Subsection (3) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994.
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of
permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in
effect on the date of injury.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for
any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34 A2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial Noise, in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) The Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall for an overpayment of compensation
described in Subsection (3)(b), reimburse the overpayment:
(i) to the employer or its insurance carrier; and
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(ii) out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(d) After an employee receives compensation from the employee's employer, its
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities
amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability
compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent
total disability compensation.
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the
employer or its insurance carrier satisfies its liability under this Subsection (3) or Section
34A-2-703.
(4) This Subsection (4) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994.
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability
compensation.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for
any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34 A2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial Noise, in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier may recoup the overpayment of
compensation described in Subsection (4) by reasonably offsetting the overpayment
against future liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks.
(5) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless
otherwise agreed to by the parties, until:
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities
undertaken pursuant to Chapter 8a, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge:
(A) a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably
designed to return the employee to gainful employment; or
(B) notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless
otherwise stipulated, to:
(A) consider evidence regarding rehabilitation; and
(B) review any reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier
under Subsection (5)(a)(ii).
(b) Before commencing the procedure required by Subsection (5)(a), the
administrative law judge shall order:
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for
the employee's subsistence; and
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due the employee.
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), an order for payment of benefits described in
Subsection (5)(b) is considered a final order for purposes of Section 34A-2-212.
(d) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability
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payments made under Subsection (5)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation
liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(e) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit a reemployment
plan. If the employer or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the plan is subject
to Subsections (5)(e)(i) through (iii).
(i) The plan may include, but not require an employee to pay for:
(A) retraining;
(B) education;
(C) medical and disability compensation benefits;
(D) job placement services; or
(E) incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment.
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide
for the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process.
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment
plan. The employer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment
plan is cause for the administrative law judge on the administrative law judge's own
motion to make a final decision of permanent total disability.
(f) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not
possible, the administrative law judge shall order that the employee be paid weekly
permanent total disability compensation benefits.
(g) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that pursuant to a reemployment plan, as
prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider and presented under Subsection (5)(e), an
employee could immediately or without unreasonable delay return to work but for the
following, an administrative law judge shall order that the employee be denied the
payment of weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits:
(i) incarceration in a facility operated by or contracting with a federal, state, county, or
municipal government to house a criminal offender in either a secure or nonsecure
setting; or
(ii) not being legally eligible to be employed because of a reason unrelated to the
impairment or combination of impairments.
(6) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became
permanently totally disabled, as determined by a final order of the commission based on
the facts and evidence, and ends:
(i) with the death of the employee; or
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work.
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a permanently
totally disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job
earning at least minimum wage, except that the employee may not be required to accept
the work to the extent that it would disqualify the employee from Social Security
disability benefits.
(c) An employee shall:
(i) fully cooperate in the placement and employment process; and
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(ii) accept the reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work.
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the
work provided under Subsection (6)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier
may reduce the employee's permanent total disability compensation by 50% of the
employee's income in excess of $500.
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a
permanently totally disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, part-time work
subject to the offset provisions of Subsection (6)(d).
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time work and offset,
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under this Subsection (6) is governed by Part
8, Adjudication.
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier has the burden of proof to show that
medically appropriate part-time work is available.
(h) The administrative law judge may:
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any work:
(A) that would require the employee to undertake work exceeding the employee's:
(I) medical capacity; or
(II) residual functional capacity; or
(B) for good cause; or
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability
benefits as provided in Subsection (6)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate, parttime work is offered, but the employee fails to fully cooperate.
(7) When an employee is rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but
the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial
disability.
(8) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not entitled to
disability compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or
reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. The
administrative law judge shall dismiss without prejudice the claim for benefits of an
employee if the administrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fully cooperate,
unless the administrative law judge states specific findings on the record justifying
dismissal with prejudice.
(9) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of the following constitutes
total and permanent disability that is compensated according to this section:
(i) both hands;
(ii) both arms;
(iii) both feet;
(iv) both legs;
(v) both eyes; or
(vi) any combination of two body members described in this Subsection (9)(a).
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (9)(a) is final.
(10) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent
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total disability claim, except those based on Subsection (9), for which the insurer or selfinsured employer had or has payment responsibility to determine whether the employee
remains permanently totally disabled.
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three years after an
award is final, unless good cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to
allow more frequent reexaminations.
(c) The reexamination may include:
(i) the review of medical records;
(ii) employee submission to one or more reasonable medical evaluations;
(iii) employee submission to one or more reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and
retraining efforts;
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns;
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and
(vi) employee completion of one or more sworn affidavits or questionnaires approved
by the division.
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a reexamination with
appropriate employee reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel allowance and
per diem as well as reasonable expert witness fees incurred by the employee in
supporting the employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at the time of
reexamination.
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a
permanent total disability finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension
of the employee's permanent total disability benefits until the employee cooperates with
the reexamination.
(f) (i) If the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding reveals evidence that
reasonably raises the issue of an employee's continued entitlement to permanent total
disability compensation benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may petition the
Division of Adjudication for a rehearing on that issue. The insurer or self-insured
employer shall include with the petition, documentation supporting the insurer's or selfinsured employer's belief that the employee is no longer permanently totally disabled.
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (10)(f)(i) demonstrates good cause, as determined
by the Division of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall adjudicate the issue at
a hearing.
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work
may not be the sole basis for termination of an employee's permanent total disability
entitlement, but the evidence of the employee's participation in medically appropriate,
part-time work under Subsection (6) may be considered in the reexamination or hearing
with other evidence relating to the employee's status and condition.
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge may award
reasonable attorney fees to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the
employee's interests with respect to reexamination of the permanent total disability
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finding, except if the employee does not prevail, the attorney fees shall be set at $1,000.
The attorney fees awarded shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier in
addition to the permanent total disability compensation benefits due.
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication, if the employee fully
cooperates, each insurer, self-insured employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
shall continue to pay the permanent total disability compensation benefits due the
employee.
(11) If any provision of this section, or the application of any provision to any person
or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section is given effect without the
invalid provision or application.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801(8)(a): Within 30 days after the day on which the decision
of the commissioner or Appeals Board is issued, an aggrieved party may secure judicial
review by commencing an action in the court of appeals against the commissioner or
Appeals Board for the review of the decision of the commissioner or Appeals Board.
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(l): As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings.
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a): (2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources,
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
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